Abstract. Research on venture capital (VC) internationalization has expanded rapidly over the last decade. This paper reviews the extant literature on VC internationalization and highlights gaps in our knowledge. We identify three major research streams within this literature, which revolve around the following questions: (1) which VC firms invest across borders and what countries do they target; (2) how do VC firms address liabilities of foreign investing; and (3) what are the real effects of international VC investments? We provide an overview of the contributions in these research streams, discuss the role of public policy, and suggest avenues for future research. Specifically, we call for a deeper understanding of: (1) the functioning and impact of VC firms' modes of internationalization; (2) micro-level processes such as the functioning and decision making of international investment committees, or the development of international human and social capital; (3) the role of country institutions in VC internationalization and its real effects; and (4) the interplay of international VC with alternative financing sources.
Introduction
Venture capital is a subset of private equity and refers to investments made for the launch, early growth or expansion of companies.
1 Many high profile companies including Apple, Facebook, Spotify, Google, Gilead Sciences, Starbucks, Airbnb, and Uber raised VC funds in their early years to boost their growth. VC firms are financial market intermediaries, specializing in the management of information asymmetries and high levels of uncertainty (Amit et al., 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 2001) . They provide capital to companies that otherwise face severe difficulties to attract financing (Wright and Robbie, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 2001) . The companies that VC firms target are typically small and young, often have negative
Country-Level Determinants
Extant research highlights several country-level determinants that impact international flows of VC (e.g., Balcarcel et al., 2010; Guler and Guillén, 2010a; Tykvová, 2011, 2012; Aizenman and Kendall, 2012) . Selected studies in this domain-that have asked the research question why some countries import or export more VC than others-are summarized in Table 1 .
An important determinant driving the import of international VC is the institutional development of the target country. International VC investors preferably target institutionally developed countries as this creates a more investor-friendly climate with more transparency and fewer information asymmetries between VC owners and their portfolio companies (Balcarcel et al., 2010; Groh et al, 2010; Guler and Guillén, 2010a; Aizenman and Kendall, 2012) . VC firms hence invest in target countries characterized by technological, legal, financial, and political institutions that create innovative opportunities, protect investors' rights, facilitate exit, and guarantee regulatory stability. Further, the local presence of qualified human capital is an important factor to attract international VC flows in countries (Aizenman and Kendall, 2012) .
Some country characteristics impact both the import and the export of VC (Groh et al, 2010) . Specifically, expected economic growth in the home and target country are important factors. Expected GDP growth in the target country is positively associated with the number of deals financed by both domestic and international investors, while expected GDP growth in the country of origin of the VC investor discourages VC exports Aizenman and Kendall, 2012) . These findings suggest that VC firms with more promising investment opportunities in their home country prefer to invest more intensively at home and less intensively abroad. Furthermore, the size of the stock market is a strong determinant of VC import and export. Active stock markets of the target countries provide exit mechanisms for successful portfolio companies (Groh et al., 2010) . A country with an active stock market will not only lead to more domestic deals, it will also attract more foreign investors. Interestingly, VC firms operating in a country with an active stock market will also invest more internationally Aizenman and Kendall, 2012) . One potential explanation for this finding is that VC firms located in countries with an active stock market may push their foreign portfolio companies to relocate to the VC firms' country of origin to facilitate IPO exits (Cumming et al., 2009a) .
Several studies have also investigated the impact of differences between target and investor country characteristics to explain VC flows between these countries. Expected economic growth differences between countries are positively related to a net flow of VC from the low growth to the high growth country . Smaller geographical distance (Colombo et al., 2017) , common language, colonial ties (Aizenman and Kendall, 2012) and between-country trust (Bottazzi et al., 2016) increase the flows of VC between countries. When countries' economies become more integrated, as in the European Union, an increase in the amount of international VC investment is likely to follow (Alhorr et al., 2008) . Institutional environments hence play an important role in international VC flows.
The presence of strong industry networks between the VC firm's home country and its target country also enhances international VC flows (Madhavan and Iriyama, 2009 ). Further, "transnational technical communities," which are groups of immigrants active in both home-and host-country technical networks, positively affect international VC flows: higher professional and technical immigration levels from a target nation to the United States predicts higher VC outflows from the United States to the target nation (Madhavan and Iriyama, 2009 ). Hochberg et al. (2010) also show that there is less entry by outside VCs in more densely networked local VC markets within the United States, i.e., markets where network ties among incumbents are strong (Hochberg et al., 2010) . Outside VC firms with established ties with local VC firms are able to overcome this barrier to entry, but other local VC firms may react strategically to increased threats of entry and heightened competition by freezing out local firms that facilitate entry (Hochberg et al., 2010) . It would be interesting to examine such potential relationships using a crosscountry dataset. 
VC Firm-Level Determinants
Besides country-level determinants, several VC firm-level determinants impact individual VC firm's probability to invest in foreign countries. Selected studies in this domain are summarized in Table 2 . Structural and strategic features of VC firms-such as their investment focus, type, and reputationimpact their probability to invest across borders (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992; Fritsch and Schilder, 2008; Cumming and Dai, 2010) . VC investment strategies that require higher resource consumption in the form of stronger monitoring are associated with a narrower geographic scope. This includes acting as lead investor or targeting entrepreneurial ventures with very high information asymmetries such as early stage or technology ventures. Corporate VC firms and more reputable VC firms-i.e., older, larger, more experienced, and with a stronger IPO track record-exhibit a broader geographic scope (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992; Cumming and Dai, 2010) . These VC investors seem better able to reduce information asymmetries associated with distance. In contrast, government-related VC firms have a narrow geographic scope (Bertoni et al., 2015) . Finally, VC firms in which investment managers can devote more time to their portfolio companies (i.e., VC firms with more investment executives per portfolio company) also have a broader geographic scope (Fritsch and Schilder, 2008) , consistent with larger distance requiring higher time commitments of the VC investors.
A VC firm's human capital (the nature of the experience of its managers) and social capital (its network of syndication partners) strongly determine its internationalization strategy. First, with respect to a VC firms' human capital, the international investment experience of a VC firm's investment managers impacts its geographic scope (Patzelt et al., 2009; Tykvová, 2011, 2012; De Prijcker et al., 2012) . VC firms with more managers with foreign experience invest more intensively abroad Tykvová, 2011, 2012) because they are more familiar with the institutional and legal environment in foreign countries and have a better access to international networks. Higher proportions of investment managers with international or entrepreneurial experience also lead to a broader geographic investment scope (Patzelt et al., 2009; De Prijcker et al., 2012) . Inherited knowledge through prior foreign work experience of VC firm's management outside the focal VC firm also has a positive effect on internationalization (De Prijcker et al., 2012) .
Second, a VC firm's social capital also has a major impact on its geographic scope (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Cumming and Dai, 2010; Iriyama et al., 2010; Vedula and Matusik, 2017) . Social networks in the VC industry-developed through syndication-diffuse information about potential investment opportunities across boundaries, thereby expanding the spatial investment radius of VC investors (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001) . Better networked VC firms hence exhibit less local bias (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Cumming and Dai, 2010) . These results show that despite communication technology advances, inherent boundaries around the flow of timely, reliable, fine grained and high-quality information still produce localized patterns of exchange. Better networked VC firms are able to reduce information asymmetries associated with distance through interpersonal social relations with local investors. Interestingly, Vedula and Matusik (2017) show that while syndication partners with foreign experience positively impact USA VC firms' first internationalization decision, social cues from geographically proximal peers have an even stronger impact.
Strategies to Compensate for Liabilities of Foreignness
Multiple studies show that portfolio companies differ in the way they are sourced, funded, syndicated and monitored by domestic versus international VC firms (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006) . 2 The increased geographical, cultural, and institutional distance that foreign VC firms face, severely limits domestically used strategies to mitigate information asymmetries. In a local context, VC firms manage uncertainty by sourcing favorable investment targets through their entrusted local networks and intensive screening involving face to face meetings (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001) . Moreover, VC firms provide their portfolio companies with more than financial resources: after the investment, they provide value adding services and access to other resources (Sapienza et al., 1996; Hsu, 2004) . Value adding activities are hindered when investing across borders, because these activities often require proximity and a fine-grained understanding of the local environment, especially for early stage portfolio companies (Devigne et al., 2013) . As a result, VC firms investing internationally will have to adapt their investment process rather than merely implementing the "recipes" from their domestic markets. For instance, foreign VC firms in India place greater emphasis on product market factors and accountants' reports than domestic VC firms when selecting investment targets in India and they prefer strategic monitoring and advice rather than monitoring of the operational activities because the former is easier to provide across distance (Pruthi et al., 2003) . Table 3 summarizes selected studies that examine how VC investors minimize liabilities of foreignness when investing across borders.
The first step in the VC cycle is to generate deal flow from which to select promising investment targets. A VC firm can either proactively search for deals (solicited deals) or passively wait for deals approaching (unsolicited deals) through the entrepreneur, the VC firm's network or an intermediary (Lu and Hwang, 2010) . Generating sufficient deal flow is more challenging for VCs operating across borders, as foreign VC firms originate fewer unsolicited deals from their networks compared to domestic VC firms (Lu and Hwang, 2010) . In response, international VC firms mainly draw upon their home country advantages by originating more solicited deals from networks (Lu and Hwang, 2010) . Moreover, some VC firms' domestic network advantages, such as their social status advantages, are transferable from the VC firms' home country to the target company's country (Guler and Guillén, 2010b) , leading to higher deal flow generation for higher status international VC firms.
Selecting the right investment targets among the deals presented is one of the most important drivers of VC success (Sorensen, 2007) . When targeting portfolio companies in a foreign country, a higher geographical and cultural distance and a lower embeddedness in the portfolio companies' environment hampers the transfer of soft information (Devigne et al., 2016) . A strategy used by cross-border VC firms to overcome information problems is therefore to select portfolio companies with lower ex ante information asymmetries. Foreign VC firms are more likely to invest in more information-transparent portfolio companies, i.e., in a later stage, in a later round or in larger deals Dai et al., 2012) .
When structuring the cross-border investment, deal features and legal contracts may also be used as a tool to mitigate information problems (Bengtsson and Ravid, 2009; Bottazzi et al., 2009; Balcarcel et al., 2010) . Cross-border VC investors invest larger amounts in portfolio companies in countries with worse legal protection (Balcarel et al., 2010) . This finding suggests that cross-border VC firms mitigate contracting problems in countries with weak legal environments by taking larger equity stakes (conditional on deciding to invest in a given firm), as this enables them to enforce control rights which courts may not be able to adequately enforce with smaller stakes. Further, when the geographical distance between a VC firm and its portfolio companies increases, investors negotiate contracts which give more high powered incentives to entrepreneurs, such as cash flow contingencies (Bengtsson and Ravid, 2009) , thereby more strongly aligning the interests of investors and entrepreneurs. These findings support the view that distance makes monitoring more difficult and that VC investors try to mitigate this issue through contracting.
Furthermore, VC firms' domestic legal system impacts their behavior abroad. For example, VC firms from common law countries are more prone to use downside protection clauses, not only in their domestic investments but also when investing across borders (Balcarel et al., 2010) . Bottazzi et al. (2009) further show that more developed legal systems in a VC firm's home country are associated with more VC involvement and the VC investor's legal system is more important than the portfolio company's legal system in determining investor behavior even when investing abroad.
Another way to address problems of information asymmetries, monitoring, and resource transfer is to syndicate with local VC firms because this strategy allows to outsource the monitoring and value adding functions to local coinvestors who are not hindered by geographical, cultural or institutional distance (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008; Devigne et al., 2013; Nahata et al., 2014; Huang et al., 2015; Chemmanur et al., 2016) . Additionally, a syndicate comprising both local and international VC investors provides a broader skill set, experience, and networks that may generate additional value to companies (Schertler and Tykvová, 2012; Devigne et al., 2013) . Coinvesting with domestic VC investors is especially used when entering less institutionally developed countries (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Guler and Guillén, 2010b; Meuleman and Wright, 2011; Dai et al., 2012; Chemmanur et al., 2016) , although country-level uncertainty decreases the likelihood of coinvestments with local investors (Liu and Maula, 2016 ). Yet, not all cross-border VC firms need local firms to mitigate information and resource transfer problems. Organizational learning, including a VC firm's focal country-level experience and its overall multinational experience, reduce its need to rely on local partners over time (Meuleman and Wright, 2011; Liu and Maula, 2016) . Further, VC firms with more investment executives per portfolio company learn faster and hence have a lower probability to engage in cross-border syndication (Meuleman and Wright, 2011) .
With which domestic VCs do cross-border VCs prefer to syndicate? Cross-border VCs typically prefer domestic VCs with whom they have pre-existing ties. However, high-quality legal frameworks and industry associations facilitate syndication between cross-border and local VCs and diminish the need for cross-border VCs to rely on pre-existing ties (Meuleman et al., 2017) .
Finally, the internationalization literature suggests yet another strategy to compensate for liabilities of foreignness, which is to set up a local branch office. This strategy ensures proximity to entrepreneurs, thereby reducing asymmetric information problems (Pruthi et al., 2009) . The foreign head office will typically be represented in the branches' investment committee that decides on investments and exits. This strategy allows the foreign head office to manage challenges that otherwise would require the deployment of expatriates (Pruthi et al., 2009) . When employing local investment professionals in the branches, cultural and institutional differences are reduced, thereby further facilitating the transfer of knowledge and advice to companies (Pruthi et al., 2009; De Prijcker et al., 2012; Devigne et al., 2016) . In the Chinese context, Huang et al. (2015) find that having a Chinese office made foreign VCs less likely to syndicate with local VC firms, thereby suggesting that VC firms with a local branch feel they can address liabilities of foreignness by themselves (through the local office). VC firms' decision to open a branch in a foreign region is strongly driven by the success rate of VC investments in that region (Chen et al., 2010) . Research on the use of branch offices in the VC industry remains very limited, however.
Outcomes of International VC Investments
What matters for both entrepreneurs and VC investors is the development of the portfolio company, which is ultimately associated with the exit of investors. The exit from portfolio companies is the last and perhaps most important step in the VC cycle (Wright and Robbie, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 2001) . First, the exit route determines the VC firms' returns (Ruhnka and Young, 1987) . Second, entrepreneurs are highly involved because the exit route not only impacts their financial return but also their future role within the company. Importantly, a successful outcome for the VC investor is not by definition a successful outcome for the entrepreneur. We will hence discuss the outcomes of international VC investments from the perspective of both the portfolio company and the VC investor.
Outcomes from the Perspective of the Portfolio Company
International VC investors impact their portfolio companies' development differently compared to domestic VC investors. Research has documented that companies backed by cross-border VC investors only grow more strongly in the long term (but not in the short term), while companies backed by a syndicate comprising both domestic and cross-border VC investors outperform all other combinations (e.g., domestic VC or cross border VC investors only) in terms of growth in sales, total assets and employment (Devigne et al., 2013) . This finding suggests that domestic and cross-border VC investors can play synergistic roles as their portfolio companies grow and thereby require different resources or capabilities over time.
More specifically, foreign VC investors may help their portfolio companies in their internationalization (e.g., Cumming et al., 2009b; Chahine et al., 2018) . Foreign VC firms located in a portfolio company's export market can be especially valuable by legitimizing the unknown new company in that market (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005; Mäkelä and Maula, 2006) , by playing a greater advisory and monitoring role (Chahine et al., 2018) or by relocating the company into that market (Cumming et al., 2009a) . Local VC firms may actively help their portfolio companies in attracting cross-border VC investors, especially if portfolio companies seek to internationalize (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008) or require large amounts of specialized VC funds that are not always available in the home country (Vanacker et al., 2014a) . However, as cross-border investors tend to drive their portfolio companies towards their home markets, the above benefits may turn into disadvantages if portfolio companies' export markets differ from the home markets of the cross-border VC investors (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005) .
Moreover, not all portfolio companies develop positively. Mäkelä and Maula (2006) develop a theoretical model which proposes that if a portfolio company's prospects decrease, a cross-border VC firm's commitment will drop more strongly compared to that of a domestic VC investor. Due to their lower embeddedness in the portfolio company's local environment and lower attachment to the entrepreneur, cross-border VC investors have lower attachments to their portfolio companies, thereby easing the abandonment decision (Devigne et al., 2016) . This relationship is magnified with greater geographical distance but mitigated by the relative investment size and the investor's embeddedness in local syndication networks (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006) .
In Table 4 , we summarize selected studies that have primarily focused on the consequences of international VC investments from the portfolio company's perspective.
Outcomes from the Perspective of the VC Firm
Studies on the investment success of cross-border investors present mixed evidence. On the one hand, controlling for portfolio company quality and VC firm reputation, some studies have shown that crossborder VC firms are less likely than domestic VC firms to have successful exits (Humphery-Jenner and Suchard, 2013; Li et al., 2014) . Both institutional and cultural distances decrease the likelihood of a successful exit, although a VC investor's international experience may attenuate the negative effect of institutional distance (Li et al., 2014) . This evidence is consistent with liabilities of foreignness inhibiting a successful investment process, hampered by increased information asymmetries and more limited resource transfers (Devigne et al., 2016) .
On the other hand, other studies have suggested and shown that cross-border VC investors might bring additional exit opportunities (Bertoni and Groh, 2014) . Specifically, controlling for firm performance, investor characteristics and local exit conditions, these studies show that cross-border VC firms have a higher probability of M&A and IPO exit , have faster M&A and IPO exits (Espenlaub et al., 2015) , and have higher IPO valuations Chahine et al., 2018) . do not find a difference between domestic and international VC M&A exit probability, however. The probability of a successful exit is especially higher for an international VC investor when investing in later stage companies (Humphery-Jenner and Suchard, 2013) . Moreover, Knill (2009) shows that international geographical diversification is-on a VC firm portfolio level-the only diversification strategy which has no negative effect on the portfolio company exit performance, in contrast with industry or stage diversification. Nahata et al. (2014) show that the cultural distance between countries of the portfolio company and its lead VC investor positively affects exit success. The above contradicting findings show that more research is needed to fully understand the relationship between international VC investing and exit outcomes. This relationship might, for example, be affected by macro forces such as the (difference in) institutional contexts of both investor and portfolio company, or micro forces such as VC firm and portfolio company characteristics.
Recent studies stress the benefits of local syndication for exit success of cross-border VC investments (thus, combining local and foreign VCs; Cumming and Dai, 2010; Dai et al., 2012; Wang and Wang, 2012; Nahata et al., 2014; Chemmanur et al., 2016) . Specifically, portfolio companies with both crossborder and local VC investors are about 5% more likely to exit successfully compared with portfolio companies backed by foreign VC firms only (Dai et al., 2012) . Interestingly, while Chemmanur et al. (2016) stress that this positive relationship is only present when investing in emerging countries, Nahata et al. (2014) find this relationship only in developed economies. Chemmanur et al. (2016) show thatin emerging nations and controlling for endogenous participation and syndication by cross-border VC firms-syndicates composed of domestic and cross-border VC firms have more successful exits and higher post-IPO operating performance relative to syndicates of purely domestic VC firms or purely cross-border VC firms. These findings are again consistent with local VC syndication as a powerful tool to overcome liabilities of foreignness. Still, there is also evidence from USA VC investors, suggesting that the addition of a domestic partner in their cross-border deals is not associated with the probability of an IPO exit and is even negatively associated with an M&A exit (Wuebker et al., 2015) . Again, more research is needed to clarify these contradictory findings.
The effect of foreign VC firms' human capital on the exit success of their portfolio companies is not well understood yet. While Hursti and Maula (2007) find that the international experience of the VC management team is positively related to exit performance (more foreign IPOs) in developed markets, Wang and Wang (2011) show that there is little correlation between a foreign VC firms' human capital, such as its experience, networks and reputation, and portfolio companies' exit performance in emerging markets. Instead, the domestic entrepreneurs' experience is crucial for exit performance in emerging markets (Wang and Wang, 2011) .
Target country characteristics also impact an international VC firm's exit performance. Superior legal rights and law enforcement as well as better-developed stock markets significantly enhance VC long term exit performance (Nahata et al., 2014) . More specifically, foreign VC-backed portfolio companies are more likely to successfully exit through an IPO or an M&A and investment durations are shorter in economically free countries (Wang and Wang, 2012) . The legal protection rights of VC firms' country of origin within the VC syndicate of an IPO firm negatively impacts the underpricing of IPOs, which is a sign of higher IPO quality; this negative association is stronger for IPOs involving foreign VC firms (Chahine and Saade, 2011) . This finding expands prior research on VC syndication by showing that the shareholders' protection rights of the country of origin of foreign VC syndicate members signal the quality of portfolio companies at IPO. Surprisingly, cultural distance between the portfolio company's and the lead investor's country positively affects VC success especially in emerging economies: it creates incentives for rigorous ex ante screening, improving VC performance (Nahata et al., 2014) . Additionally, Bottazzi et al. (2016) find a negative relationship between trust in a country and exit performance, especially for IPOs. However, more sophisticated investors are more likely to make low trust investments, and doing so they achieve superior performance (Bottazzi et al., 2016) . Lack of trust in a country is hence a hurdle to making VC investments, but cross-border investors who overcome this hurdle tend to do well.
In Table 5 , we provide an overview of selected studies from an increasingly rich literature that has primarily examined the consequences of international VC investors from the VC firm's perspective.
In summary, the increasing occurrence of cross-border investments despite liabilities of foreignness has raised the interesting questions among scholars of what drives these investments, how they are managed and what their outcomes are. So far, we have reviewed and synthesized the extant literature on these three major research streams of VC internationalization. We next discuss the role of public policy as an important and specific type of VC firm, before providing a more in-depth discussion of future research opportunities.
Public Policy and VC Internationalization
Governments, both at the national and local level, often try to play an active role in stimulating the development of larger and broader domestic VC markets. They can do so in several ways, for example, through direct government investment programs or through government programs that foster the formation of partnerships with private VC firms. Several studies provide excellent overviews of the debate if governments have been able to fulfill this role (e.g., Cumming, 2011; Colombo et al., 2016) . A key concern, however, is the possibility that private VC may get crowded out by public VC in domestic markets. Government interventions may further reduce cross-border investments by local private VC firms (Cumming, 2011) . In this section, we more specifically focus on the potential role of governments in stimulating international VC inflow. Should governments stimulate investments by cross-border VC firms into their country or region? Our review shows that the empirical evidence on the outcomes of international VC investments is not uniformly positive. Still, recent evidence, taking endogeneity issues into account, suggests that international VC firms, particularly in combination with domestic VC firms, foster firm development, create additional exit opportunities, and create more value at exit (e.g., Devigne et al., 2013; Bertoni and Groh, 2014; Chahine et al., 2018) . While these effects are at times more or less statistically and economically significant, even noneffects can be "good news" because governments can pursue to create more active domestic VC markets through fostering international VC flows that do not have detrimental effects for domestic portfolio companies and exit opportunities by domestic VC investors.
Moreover, for companies in particular industries that require considerable amounts of money such as biotech-and that operate in countries with developing VC markets-international VC investments might be crucial to grow into international players. For instance, in the Flemish region in Belgium, investments by international (including UK, United States, French, and Dutch) VC firms have played a critical role in the development of high growth biotech companies (Vanacker et al., 2014a) . It is also generally ignored that cross-border VC firms may not only influence the prospects of local companies and exit opportunities in a direct way; they can also stimulate the professionalization of local VC firms. Such prospects may be particularly important in countries with developing VC markets.
Our review has provided a framework of the mechanisms through which governments can facilitate inflows of international VC (from particular countries). In particular, governments can shape the formal institutional (i.e., regulatory, political, and economic) context (Holmes et al., 2016) to foster the inflow of international VC. By stimulating international networks, and international human capital formation, governments may also be influential in shaping the inflow of international VC thereby targeting specific countries that represent, for example, important export markets. Such effects can be realized through their own government-related VC investors or indirectly by providing support (e.g., through a fund of fund investment strategy) to local or foreign independent and other VC investors.
A particular point of concern for policy makers, related to international VC investments in domestic companies, might be that international investors often play an active role in venture relocation (Cumming et al., 2009a) and provide international exit opportunities (Bertoni and Groh, 2014) . Policy makers might thereby fear that the best companies (partially) leave their home country. This should not necessarily be problematic, however, as long as a domestic presence is ensured or if the outflow of companies is balanced with a comparable inflow of companies. Moreover, limiting cross-border VC flows to minimize the risk that local firms would relocate may turn out to be ineffective. Recent evidence from USA data suggests that high-tech entrepreneurs in states with limited VC availability are more likely to relocate their activities to states where VC is particularly abundant (De Prijcker et al., 2018) . While this evidence represents within country evidence, there is also anecdotal evidence that entrepreneurs move across borders to increase their odds of raising initial international VC.
Avenues for Future Research
We structure our discussion of the current state of the international VC literature as follows: we first provide a theoretical integration and an overview of key methodological gaps, we then check for general gaps, and we end with remaining gaps that are specific to each of the three research streams within this literature.
Theoretical Integration and Methodological Gaps
In this section, we provide an integration of the diverse theoretical perspectives that have been employed to understand the VC internationalization phenomenon. We further provide a discussion of important methodological challenges that have characterized the broader VC internationalization literature and beyond.
Theoretical Integration
As can be seen in Tables 1-5 , different theoretical lenses have been used to examine VC internationalization and the three major research streams of VC internationalization that we have reviewed.
Economic theories and institutional theory have been used to explain the international VC phenomenon both at the micro level (e.g., contract design and investment outcome) and at the macro level (e.g., in explaining international flows of VC). Compared to domestic VC investors, international VC investors are prone to liabilities of foreignness, induced by increased geographic, legal and cultural distance between international investors and portfolio companies. Liabilities of foreignness increase information asymmetries and make monitoring more costly, thereby increasing agency risks. Unsurprisingly, multiple studies have used agency theory and information asymmetry perspectives to increase our theoretical understanding of how international VC investors can minimize these risks.
VC investors are also confronted with heightened difficulties to provide resources to their portfolio companies, although they may provide more diverse and complementary resources. Consequently, the resource-based view of the firm (and related perspectives including social capital theory and the knowledge-based view) has been proposed as an alternative lens to understand the international VC process. Network theory has also received a lot of attention, with (local) syndicate partners being identified as important resource providers enabling to alleviate problems related to access to deal flow, agency risk, information asymmetries and resource access. A VC firm's network of syndicate partners is hence an essential resource, fitting in the resource-based view of the firm as well. It enables access to investment targets, broadens the resource base available for a portfolio company and helps the transfer of resources to the portfolio company.
Taken together, scholars have employed diverse theoretical frameworks to gain better insights into the challenges, drivers, strategies, and outcomes of international VC investments. However, as we detail below, many challenging questions remain underexplored.
Methodological Issues
A first important methodological concern that casts a long shadow over the many reviewed studies is that the receipt of international VC is endogenous (for a similar problem in the broader strategy and entrepreneurial finance literature, see Shaver, 1998 and Eckhardt et al., 2006) . Companies do not attract financing from international VC firms at random; rather, they may choose specific investors that are optimal given their characteristics and those of their industries. Moreover, international VC firms themselves do not invest at random; rather, they may choose specific portfolio companies, including those that are of higher quality and thus more likely to succeed. When empirical models do not account for such multistage selection on hard-to-measure or unobservable characteristics, this may potentially lead to misspecified models and incorrect conclusions.
Unfortunately, few of the reviewed papers have employed natural experiments or more advanced econometric techniques that are able to disentangle "selection" effects from "treatment" effects. Hence, only few studies truly allow for a causal interpretation to the actual influence of international VC. Notable exceptions are found particularly in the more recent literature. For example, Chemmanur et al. (2016) use an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach to account for endogeneity of international VC participation and endogeneity in the syndication choice of international VCs. They also use natural experiments using bilateral air service agreements and terror activities in India. As another example, also use an IV approach. Specifically, they first estimate the level of internationalization in syndication and, then, use this predicted value as the new variable of interest in the analysis of the portfolio company's exit.
A second important concern relates to the secondary data sources that are generally used in the international VC literature and beyond (e.g., Cumming et al., 2009b; Cumming and Johan, 2017) . Tables  1-5 show a clear dominance of studies that use commercial databases such as Thomson's VentureXpert and Bureau van Dijk's Zephyr. Despite the strengths of these databases, they also have specific issues. For example, there are often a significant number of "undisclosed" investors (Huang et al., 2015) . Moreover, investments attributed to the local subsidiary of a foreign VC firm are often considered domestic (Huang et al., 2015) . In addition, these databases also give rise to several biases, including a statistical bias due to differences in variable definitions (e.g., the definition of VC is not always consistent across countries) and collection methods (Cumming et al., 2009b) thereby sometimes under-representing specific types of investments such as early-stage and small VC investments, or specific countries. These databases also lack control groups of companies that either did not search for (international) VC but have similar characteristics as firms that did, or tried to obtain such financing but were unsuccessful (Cumming and Johan, 2017) . Previous work has shown that the use of different international datasets can provide different answers to research questions (Cumming et al., 2014) , which might explain some of the contradictory findings.
Scholars have addressed these challenges by combining multiple data sources and including research teams from multiple countries. A good example is the VICO database capturing detailed data on companies from seven European countries that raised VC and matched firms that did not raise VC (Bertoni and Martí, 2011) . To construct the database multiple data sources have been used, including Thomson ONE (VentureXpert), Zephyr but also national databases. The data was consolidated by a central authority that relied on the data collection efforts and experience from teams in each country. Other scholars have relied on alternative data sources, such as surveys or proprietary data from specific VC firms. But these data sources, obviously, have their own specific shortcomings, including relatively limited response rates or additional selection issues.
General Gaps
We have summarized an increasingly rich literature on VC firm internationalization, with a focus on international flows of VC, the international VC investment process and the outcome of international VC investments. Yet, many studies have treated VC firm internationalization as a dummy variable: VC firms have either conducted cross-border investments or not (Cumming et al., 2009b) . While this represents an important dimension of VC firm internationalization, several other dimensions have been relatively ignored, such as the internationalization intensity and diversity, the entry mode or the impact of the institutional context.
Studies in international business have also explored other aspects of internationalization, such as its intensity (defined as foreign sales to total sales, which in our context could represent the size of foreign investments relative to total investments) and diversity (defined as the number of countries, sometimes weighted by their geographical and cultural difference from the home country, in which a firm generates sales, which in our context could represent the number of foreign countries in which a VC firm has invested) (Fernhaber et al., 2008; Paeleman et al., 2017) .
Relatedly, an important area in international business relates to the entry strategy of firms (Zhao et al., 2004) . How do they enter foreign markets: through greenfield investments, acquisitions, joint ventures, or other entry modes? VC firms seeking international expansion face a comparable choice. They may either directly invest from their home country or they may set up a local subsidiary. Many VC firms develop a "hub" strategy, whereby they set up a foreign subsidiary which serves a whole region spanning several countries. For example, many foreign VC firms set up a subsidiary in London with the aim to invest across Continental Europe, or invest in East Asia through a subsidiary in Hong Kong or Singapore. Surprisingly, VC firms' entry modes of internationalization have been largely neglected in the VC literature. Both the drivers and impact of the internationalization mode should be further examined Pruthi et al., 2003; Guler and Guillén, 2010a) . A related interesting question is whether there is a life cycle to these entry modes . Do VC firms first invest across borders from their headquarters, which is a flexible entry mode that can easily be reversed, and only invest in a local subsidiary at a later stage, for which the investments are larger and more irreversible? Does entry mode depend on the target country?
In addition, while research on VC internationalization is growing rapidly, research on its flip side, namely deinternationalization, is scant. Internationalization moves may fail, leading firms to abandon their international activities and thus de-internationalize. Research focusing on this withdrawing process from international markets is critical as factors that influence the decision to pursue a particular strategic course of action, such as internationalization, and factors that influence the decommitment from that course of action, such as de-internationalization, are expected to be fundamentally different. Moreover, recent events including Brexit (e.g., Cumming and Zahra, 2016) and the election of USA President Trump with his "deglobalization" rhetoric might be additional forces that impact VC deinternationalization. Unfortunately, research on the firm-level (e.g., performance of prior international investments) and macrolevel (e.g., Brexit) mechanisms that may drive VC investors to abandon their prior internationalization strategies is completely lacking.
Further, the role of the institutional context, both in the home and the recipient country, warrants further scrutiny. For example, the decision of a French VC firm to invest in a Belgian company (with both countries sharing a border and having a rather comparable institutional context) is expected to be fundamentally different from the decision to invest in a USA or Chinese company. Some studies have indeed reported important differences between international VC behavior in developed and emerging markets (e.g., Dai et al., 2012) . A further analysis of the differences in VC firm internationalization between developing and developed markets-and different institutional contexts more broadly -provides an interesting area of future research. This is especially interesting, as there is currently an increased tendency of VC investors from developing markets (e.g., China, Russia) to invest in more developed countries. For example, an important question is whether there are differences between emerging VC markets compared to developed markets in structuring and monitoring investments .
Many studies on VC internationalization decisions have focused on samples of independent VC firms. Still, in many countries, other types of VC investors are active including government VC, corporate VC, and bank-affiliated VC. Bertoni et al. (2015) illustrate that corporate VC investors are 77.4% more inclined to invest across borders. Governments VC investors, however, are especially specialized in domestic companies. They are 73% more oriented to invest domestically than the full sample. Nevertheless, research on how internationalization of corporate or bank-related VC investors might be different, for example, due to the international scope of their parent company, is lacking. Some studies on the outcomes of international VC investments have controlled for VC investor type. However, these studies do not examine how different types of international investors uniquely behave or influence investments outcomes. This raises important questions for future research. For example, how do syndicates comprising local investors and different types of international VC investors influence outcomes?
We further lack insight into micro-level processes in international VC firms. For example, the role of the investment committee in international investment decision-making or the implications of the investment committee's structure and composition for international staffing are still not fully understood (Pruthi et al., 2009) . It would also be relevant to investigate in more detail the process of international staffing, especially from the perspective of local offices (Pruthi et al., 2009) . Detailed longitudinal case studies might be very instrumental here, to obtain a detailed insight into these processes.
Finally, another general gap in our understanding of VC firm internationalization is how other sources of entrepreneurial finance might work with VC to enable internationalization. The international VC literature, just like the VC literature in general, is largely segmented by the source of financing (Cumming and Johan, 2017) . In other words, VC studies generally exclusively focus on VC but ignore the other sources of financing that companies attract. With the growing importance of "new" sources of financing such as crowdfunding (Cumming and Johan, 2016) , business angel groups (Shane, 2008) and Initial Coin Offerings, it would be interesting to gain a better understanding of how these other sources of entrepreneurial finance influence the behavior of VC investors and their cross-border activities more specifically. In the case of crowdfunding, for example: Do larger local crowdfunding markets compete with local VC firms for deals, and if so does it push local VC firms to invest across borders? Does the visibility provided by crowdfunding campaigns remove some of the barriers encountered by foreign VC firms? Do international investors syndicate with angel investors, who mainly operate locally, but who may be strongly embedded in their region? While the interaction with other sources of entrepreneurial finance is quite straightforward, it seems not farfetched to assume that also other, more general sources of finance could play a role. However, we know very little so far about the potential that the banking sector might play for VC internationalization. Does an active and well developed bank sector enhance or discourage international VC investment? And what about interfirm credit; do local traditions with respect to trade credit use matter for international VC decisions?
Current Gaps in the Determinants of International VC Investments
Research provides several areas of future research on country-level determinants of international VC flows. Some of the unresolved questions are: Are there temporal variations in the internationalization of the VC industry? For example, the VC industry is cyclical and prone to periodic booms and busts. Could there be differences in global inflow and outflow patterns depending on these cyclical stages (Madhavan and Iriyama, 2009) ? What drives the number of countries in which the VC firm has international investments (De Prijcker et al., 2012) ? Do international VC firms find foreign countries more attractive based on the characteristics of the available co-investors to syndicate or on the presence of other home-country VC firms (Guler and Guillén, 2010a) ? What is the impact of technical immigration as opposed to overall professional immigration on international VC flows? Such refinements would allow scholars to get closer to the drivers of international entrepreneurship in high-technology domains (Iriyama et al., 2010 ).
Next to country-level determinants, the literature also provides areas of future research on VC firm determinants. Do different VC investors demonstrate different levels of tolerance for risk taking related to a global investment strategy? What are the determinants of such differences, as well as their consequences (Madhavan and Iriyama, 2009 )? Finally, country-level and firm-level determinants will not necessarily operate independently (e.g., Vanacker et al., 2014b) , which begs the question how country-level factors (including formal and informal country-level institutions) interact with firm-level factors?
Current Gaps in the Strategies to Compensate for Liabilities of Foreignness
Although several studies have started to investigate how international VC investors cope with liabilities of foreignness, there remain unanswered research questions. First, analyzing companies that have tried but failed to raise foreign VC would help to understand more accurately the role of local investors in raising foreign VC (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008) . Next, are there differences between domestic and international VC firms in screening and valuing potential portfolio companies? More specifically, to what extent do foreign VC firms adapt their approaches to local market conditions? If so, how do they adapt their approaches to deal with different asymmetric information problems (Pruthi et al., 2003) ? Do VC firms, for instance, replicate the network connections present in their home countries in the new markets they enter (Guler and Guillén, 2010b) ? Foreign VC firms may also gain external knowledge through domestic syndication partners that have relevant international investment experience or through other network partners, for example, international shareholders or service providers such as lawyers or consultants. To what extent are these other partners substitutes for foreign syndication partners, or do they complement them in different ways (De Prijcker et al., 2012) ? Do the technology level of potential investments, the background and experience levels of the VC firm's general partners, and the market for IPOs or other forms of exit available to VC firms impact the investment preferences of VC firms (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992) ?
How can mechanisms, such as expatriating staff and hiring local talents effectively overcome hurdles related to information frictions and cultural differences in international VC investments (Dai et al., 2012) ? In which environments do local executives effectively substitute for local coinvestors for internationalizing firms seeking to invest in foreign markets (Pruthi et al., 2009) ? Is it possible to make the expertise of key people in the home country available through investment committees (Pruthi et al., 2009) ? How can VC firms use a mix of strategies-attracting local partners, working with local VC firms or setting up local branches-in order to deal with the peculiarities of the local environment (Meuleman and Wright, 2011)? 
Current Gaps Related to the Outcomes of International Investments
Given the mixed evidence presented before, several important questions on the outcomes of international VC investments require further research attention. What is the relation between distance and the probability of nonrational continuation of commitment to a portfolio company that does not meet the initial prospects (i.e., escalation of commitment; Mäkelä and Maula, 2006; Devigne et al., 2016) ? Is international VC firm's commitment influenced by country-specific factors other than distance (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006) or by entry mode (Devigne et al., 2016) ? Foreign VC firms may help professionalize local entrepreneurial firms given their experience of advising and nurturing portfolio companies in their home countries. Do these local entrepreneurial companies have spillover effects on their peers which are currently not financed by foreign VC firms (Dai et al., 2012) ? In the same vein, how does the presence of foreign VC firms, either directly or through a local subsidiary, and their partnership with local VC firms help professionalize local VC firms (Dai et al., 2012) ?
Further, can foreign VC firms provide other value-added benefits, such as increased internationalization, even if they are not per se associated with portfolio company success (Humphery-Jenner and Suchard, 2013) ? What is the role played by foreign VC firms in portfolio companies after the IPO? Foreign VC firms might provide a better contact with international investors; facilitate the presence of portfolio companies in foreign markets; and they might also provide valuable help in portfolio companies' internationalization process (Chahine and Saade, 2011) . Finally, there may be unobserved determinants associated with the relocation of portfolio companies such as tax strategies, the size of VC markets, branch offices in different countries (e.g., Cumming et al., 2009a) .
Overall Conclusion
Although there has been a recent wave of research on international VC, spurred by the internationalization of the VC industry, many important questions remain unaddressed and warrant further scrutiny. With this paper, we have provided a timely overview of the international VC literature and identified important future research directions. We hope that with this paper we will foster further research on international VC in multiple disciplines (and hopefully also across disciplines) including economics, entrepreneurship, finance, and management.
